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Transpersonal as a Whole Person / All Person Approach
Editor's Introduction

T

he vision of an integrative psychology
that encompasses the whole person is an
inspiring one—holistic views on mental
and emotional wellbeing working in collaboration
with conventional methods, and topics of human
presence and consciousness taking their place
alongside cognition and behavior. In an integrative
psychology the rigorous field of parapsychology
would no longer be set apart, since psychology
would be truly inclusive of all aspects of human
being as they are expressed in cultures across the
world. Yet sketching the broad and uplifting strokes
of such an enterprise is much easier than discerning
how such an integration might be implemented
effectively.
If an integrative psychology is to be more
than a crudely sewn patchwork of scientific and
popular ideas, it needs to be able to embrace diverse
cultural frames of reference in ways that create a
degree of cohesion. This cohesion cannot be one
achieved by imposing a uniform framework on the
riotous variety of human societies. For example,
assuming that all spiritual traditions are attempting
to achieve nondual consciousness imposes an illfitting frame that exalts some paths and denigrates
others based on a construct that is likely foreign
to many of the associated communities (Ferrer,
2002). Nor can inclusiveness be accomplished by
naïvely substituting traditional beliefs for the tenets
of science. For example, the Buddhist notion of
emptiness is a spiritual or philosophical concept that

can be studied by science, but cannot be adopted
as part of science (e.g., Van Gordon et al., 2016).
Before going further, it may be useful to
consider what kind of integration will best serve
an integrative psychology. Integration can be the
mere incorporation of different elements whether
or not they form a congruent whole—as in, adding
pennies to pancake batter—or in the unequal
inclusion of societal groups—as in slavery or ethnic
underclasses. Much of integrative medicine seems
to take this approach by simply including alternative
health care treatments such as acupuncture or other
traditional methods along with scientific medicine,
even though there is no shared framework to guide
these combinations (cf. Gavura, 2013).
Integration can also be a coordination
of different elements that attempts to bring them
into some harmony. Earlier pursuits of this form of
integration in psychology include efforts to organize
the discipline on the basis of behavioral units (Marston
et al., 1931), integrated psychological states (Thorne,
1967), self-knowledge (Welwood, 1979), or visions
of a unifying spiritual ultimate (Wilber, 1999). The
first three of these have not taken root, and the last,
though moderately influential, is more of a spiritual
philosophy than a psychology (Hartelius, 2017).
While there have been calls for a set of psychological
principles that can account harmoniously for the
entire range of culturally situated human experience
(Kozlov, 2009; Rongshuang, 2002; Walsh & Vaughan,
1983), this goal has not been achieved.
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Applications of participatory thought
(Ferrer, 2002,
2017; Hartelius & Ferrer, 2013) within

transpersonal psychology may open the way for
a middle ground between simple incorporation
and forced efforts at harmonization: an integrative
approach that is congruent enough to remain a
scientific discipline yet inclusive of a much broader
range of human experience and approaches to
healing and post-conventional development.
What this requires is not less science—not some
diminished, diluted, or compromised version
of science—but more science. When scientific
researchers encounter, say, an indigenous culture,
they are careful to distinguish between the beliefs of
that community and the empirical facts. But those
same researchers may at times be less critical about
the filters and assumptions of their own culture, and
may allow some of the latter to become absorbed
into scientific culture. It is by developing a more
critical stance toward the common-sense reality
assumptions of Western culture that more science
can open the way for more inclusion in psychology
(Hartelius et al., 2017).
A step in the right direction is illustrated
by Bakow and Low’s (2018) study of South African
individuals who experienced ukuthwasa—the calling
to become a sangoma, or indigenous healer. This
calling involves symptoms in the thwasa—the called
individual—that in Western terms are diagnosed
as “a brief psychotic disorder, schizophrenia, or
a depression with psychotic features” (p. 448);
psychiatric treatment is reported to be ineffective,
but traditional healers appear to obtain resolutions.
One thwasa who worked as a Western-trained
professional had the experience of understanding
her symptoms as psychotic, but simultaneously as
representing communication from her ancestors. The
authors wisely called for a “culture-specific, pluralistic
understanding” (p. 436) of such conditions—
appreciating that “underlying biological phenomena
are manifested in culture-specific ways” (p. 449).
This proposal represents a strong step forward
toward an approach that incorporates both cultural
contextuality and scientific views.
One limitation of Bakow and Low’s (2018)
universalistic/relativistic model is that in a scholarly
setting neurobiological findings will be considered
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empirical and primary, while those related to
culture will be understood as culturally constructed
and secondary. While this South African study is
a thoughtful and valuable pluristically informed
inquiry, the resulting model is not cross-cultural. By
assuming that the biological phenomena associated
with ukuthwasa are universal and “underlying”
(p. 449), and that culture merely shapes their
manifestation, the study ultimately situates its crosscultural findings in a monocultural frame.
What is lacking here is scientific maintenance of a skeptical stance toward the reality
assumptions of Western culture just as is done with
indigenous or other cultures. Reality assumptions
within worldviews are both more pervasive and
more tenuously grounded than many of the more
pragmatic expectations within societies. For
example, traditional Zulu culture holds that ancestors
can communicate with the living (Bakow & Low,
2018), but White Western Christian cultures usually
assume this is impossible; there is no definitive
evidence either way. Yet psychologists will routinely
describe positions such as the Zulu understanding
of ancestor communication as a belief, while
neglecting to observe that the contrary stance—that
such phenomena cannot occur—is also a belief.
I got my first glimpse of this fact at the age
of 16 when, newly graduated from high school,
I made my first trip to Israel to participate in the
archaeological excavation of Caesarea Maritima—a
city founded by Herod the Great on the shores of
the Mediterranean. On weekends, dig volunteers
like myself were transported to Jerusalem where we
rested, partied, or explored the sites. I was prone to
the latter, wandering through the Old City on my own
and taking in the feeling of an ancient walled city as if
it might transport me to a direct experience of longdistant eras. While on one of these jaunts I observed
that here I was part of a world with quite different
languages, customs, and views—one that was but
a ripple in a river that already stretched back for
thousands of years when Suleiman the Magnificent
built its current battlements in the 16th century. This
world was bustling and thriving before English was
created—before cars or steam engines or science or
even “the West”—and yet this very different world
worked perfectly well. My world then—archaeology
Hartelius

and universities and eight-track tape players—was
just one of many viable human worlds.
In the psychology of the world that I live in
today, the notion that a Zulu person in South Africa
can be called by their dead ancestors is no more
than a cultural superstition. Yet this is not so much
a scientific skepticism as it is a Western skepticism;
it is not so much a neutral empiricism as a firm
cultural belief that ancestor communication—along
with similar exceptional human experiences—is
impossible. Were that same skepticism also directed
towards these adamant Western disbeliefs, it might
be possible to arrive instead at a warmly interested
agnosticism towards such experiences that holds
many things as possible while it looks for better
evidence (cf. Maslow, 1970).
Behind this firm disbelief of certain widelyreported human phenomena is something beyond a
concern about the inclusion of metaphysical ideas
in scientific discussion. Metaphysical ideas are, of
course, ones that can never be experimentally tested.
Physicists routinely assume that space is infinite, or that
there may be multiple universes, despite the fact that
it is unlikely either idea could ever be experimentally
verified—and this raises few eyebrows. At the same
time, a paper was retracted after presenting evidence
that certain individuals were able to detect whether
or not a person in a photograph was currently alive,
at statistically verified levels above chance (Delorme
et al., 2016). Despite being experimentally verified in
at least a preliminary way, the phenomenon under
study was apparently deemed impossible. Yet any
number of non-Western cultures more familiar with
such kinds of human experiences might find such
an ability quite credible. Given that physics has also
offered many odd and counterintuitive ideas that
have been received tentatively and later proven to
be measurable, it seems likely that the rejection of
research on some exceptional human capacities
rests not so much on sound scientific reasoning as
on unacknowledged cultural biases within scientific
culture.
A limitation of scientific psychology, then,
is not its skepticism of other cultural beliefs, but
its credulousness towards beliefs and disbeliefs
rooted in mainstream Western culture. While it is
true that extraordinary claims require extraordinary
Is Diversity Possible in an Integrative Psychology?

evidence, what is considered extraordinary in
one culture may be quite mundane in another;
for example, communication with ancestors is
apparently not extraordinary in Zulu culture. If
one imagines science in the center of a circle, with
various cultural perspectives arranged around the
periphery, the critique here is that one culture—in
the form of mainstream Western thought—has been
given a privileged chair in the center of the circle,
next to science, where it co-directs its skepticism
outward towards other cultural locations (Figure 1).
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Figure 1. While science routinely brackets the reality assumptions
of non-Western cultures (B-L), there appears to be some degree
of conflation between scientific culture (S) and Western culture
(A), so that some Western assumptions about reality have become
implicit in the practice of science.

A first step toward more effective pluralism
would then be to shift Western thought and culture
out of its privileged location relative to science and
return it to the periphery along with the rest of the
world’s societies (Figure 2). This approach contrasts
with scattered efforts to create greater inclusiveness
by placing some other culture in the position of
privilege—for example, Buddhist psychology,
Christian psychology, or Indigenous psychology.
Substituting one set of cultural biases for another is
not likely to result in better science (Figure 3), but
making every effort to discern between science and
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embedded Western beliefs posturing as scientific
realities, will improve the field.
Such a change would be less about principles
of systematic rigor and experimental design, and
more about which research questions can be asked
without a priori elimination based on unexamined
assumptions implicit within a Western worldview.
Its impact would be felt disproportionately in areas
such as psychology, sociology, and anthropology,
where cultural assumptions about the nature of
human persons and communities may covertly
inform trajectories of research in ways that reinforce
those same initial biases in a form of circularity.
Such a shift would be particularly relevant to
types of mystical, spiritual, and exceptional human
experiences that are commonly reported in various
cultures but marginalized in Western societies.
A simple example comes from a study of
the impact of tea blessed by Buddhist monks (Shiah
& Radin, 2013). In this study, adults unknowingly
drinking tea treated with good intentions reported
greater improvements in mood than those who
believed they were drinking blessed tea, but were
drinking untreated tea. That is, the reported impact
of the treated tea on mood, when partaken without
knowledge, was greater than the placebo effect

of drinking untreated tea believed to be blessed.
If replicable, this should be acceptable as direct
scientific evidence despite its unfamiliarity to a
Western reader. While there are any number of
cultures that consider blessing to be a transmission
that carries real world impact, Western culture
views it as merely a social symbol—and holds as
superstition the belief that it is anything more. It
should be empirical evidence that helps to determine
which of these positions is a cultural preconception.
One might validly ask whether subjecting
experiential phenomena to a scientific lens reduces
them to a materialistic view. This is problematic
mainly if materialism is taken in its Western
form. Western materialism, following superficial
understandings of Descartes, divides reality into
the material and the non-dimensional mental, with
the latter also encompassing the spiritual; it seems
likely that Descartes himself may not have held fully
with the mind/body dualism that is ascribed to him
(Urban, 2018). In this Cartesian frame, mental and
spiritual phenomena have no substantive reality. Yet
materialism as a philosophical stance that assumes
everything is physical, is different than a Cartesian
or Western materialism that specifically excludes
mental and spiritual phenomena from the material
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Figure 2. As scientific culture (S) is decentered from Western
culture (A), it becomes more feasible to establish dialogical
relations between science and diverse cultures.
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Figure 3. Decentering science from Western culture appears to be
a more effective approach to inclusion of diversity than attempting
to center scientific culture (S) on a given non-Western culture (D).
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domain. A thoroughgoing materialism would
necessarily extend the definition of materiality to
include these (cf. Strawson, 2006a, 2006b), rather
than reducing them to a Western materiality or
ascribing them to a transcendent dimension and
excluding them from scientific reality. A more
expansive materialism would result in an open
naturalism (Ferrer, 2014) that eschews Western
metaphysical preconceptions of materiality.
The primary effect of applying a more
expansive materialism to mental and spiritual
phenomena is not that these are in any way reduced,
but that the what it is like to be a living form (Nagel,
1974) is made indelibly real, and the realm of the
spiritual is situated firmly in this world, implicit and
accessible within everyday life. An open naturalism
will assume that qualitative mental experience and
spiritual phenomena will be in some way measurable
because they are real, even if first efforts can only
rely on qualitative accounts (Hartelius, 2014). A
science decentered from Western attitudes will
remain rigorously empirical, but will not exclude
exceptional human experiences as "paranormal" or
marginalize their study as "parapsychological" on
the basis of cultural assumptions (Hartelius, 2016).
Yet one might ask whether such an
approach still elevates science—itself a sort of
culture—above other forms of human culture. In
participatory thought (Ferrer, 2002; Hartelius &
Ferrer, 2013), various cultural locations—that is,
worldviews and associated schemas—are held in an
egalitarian manner, with no one location ascribed
more “reality”—or ontological priority—than any
other. No culture is more “correct” than another,
or closer to “truth” than another (cf. Rorty, 1979).
Science would be one such location, with no more
ontological priority than others (Hartelius, 2019).
This is not to throw the towel into a
relativistic soup pot where different schemas
and viewpoints all float about to be ladled out at
random. A particular schema can and should have
functional priority in certain contexts, even if this
does not confer ontological priority. If the context
is a romantic evening, it would likely be unwise to
undertake an extended blunt appraisal of a partner’s
shortcomings and choices of clothing. In this sense,
some schemas will have effective priority based on
Is Diversity Possible in an Integrative Psychology?

context and purpose, even if this does not make
them “more real.” In the context of the Bakow
and Low (2018) study, the two cultures that would
have functional priority would be those of science
and Zulu society; the priorities and assumptions
of Western culture, pointedly, would have no
particular relevance. In a summary of the results,
pluralism would be deepened if the perspectives
from both the scientific and the Zulu communities
were expressed as findings.
Likely it is not possible to create a full
separation between science and the assumptions
of Western society—or between any scientist and
the views of the community in which they were
raised. This is no reason to evade the pragmatic and
promising task of adopting a more skeptical stance
toward notions that are common in Western culture
but foreign to many other societies. Psychology
cannot and must not be a discipline shaped to
the minds of White Europeans and Americans,
that then enacts a subtle racism or colonialism (cf.
Ferrer, 2002) under the guise of science as it spreads
through the world (Hartelius, 2018).
Transpersonal psychology, with its aspiration
to be a whole person / all person psychology (term
credit to Anna King, personal communication, June,
2020), has maintained a commitment to science
alongside a critique of scientism as an ideology
(Friedman, 2002, 2015). It is this double commitment
to rigorous empirical inquiry and authentic human
experience (Hartelius et al., 2018), along with the
development of participatory thought (Ferrer, 2002,
2008, 2017), that offers a potential contribution to the
development of an effective integrative psychology.
A way to characterize transpersonal psychology that reflects this wider aspiration is as a
transformative and integrative psychology of the
whole person in intimate relationship with a diverse,
interconnected, and evolving world, with special
emphasis on exceptional states of consciousness.
Such an approach would require collaboration
between numerous areas of psychology, bringing
together humanistic and positive psychology notions
of cultivating human virtues, strengths, and potentials
(transformative; Starcher & Allen, 2016; Linley et al.,
2006), integral psychology’s aspirations for a more
inclusive and cohesive field (integrative; Wilber, 2000),
International Journal of Transpersonal Studies
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a scientific emphasis on critical rigor and empirical
evidence (psychology), transpersonal psychology’s
emphasis on inclusion of all aspects of the human
person in their social and ecological contexts (whole
person in intimate relationship with world, with special
emphasis on exceptional states of consciousness;
Hartelius et al., 2007)—which would necessarily also
imply inclusion of cognitive, behavioral, neuroscientific,
and other conventional approaches to psychology—
participatory thought’s emancipatory approaches to
social justice (diverse; Ferrer, 2002), phenomenology’s
engagement with lived experience as a unified whole
(interconnected; Wojnar & Swanson, 2007), and
process philosophy understandings of human beings
and their contexts as inseparable aspects of a dynamic
self-organizing system (evolving world; Gendlin, 1997;
Varela et al., 1974; von Bertalanffy, 1950).
While these integrative aspirations of transpersonal psychology are rather outsized in comparison with its own current capacities, it can offer this
vision—rooted in its own historical self-definitions
(Hartelius et al., 2007)—along with the outlines of
what may be a way to achieve a psychology that is
at once more widely inclusive of human diversity
and structured in a way that integrates this diversity
more effectively.
In This Issue
his issue has three general section papers,
spanning spiritual emergence and emergency,
psychedelic-assisted therapy, and Islamic spirituality.
The first of these, by Kylie P. Harris, Adam J. Rock,
and Gavin I. Clark, entitled, Spiritual Emergenc(y),
Psychosis and Personality: Investigating the Role
of Schizotypy, considers the role of psychoticlike personality traits in spiritual emergence and
emergency. It is well known that the markers of
spiritual emergence and spiritual emergency are
virtually identical with those of psychosis, with the
difference perhaps being more in how the person’s
condition is held than in its symptomology.
The paper reports on a study with 250
participants that demonstrates measurable differences between individuals with a spiritual emergency and those with clinical psychosis whose
prognosis is likely to be poor. This is an invaluable
study for clinicians dealing with clients who might

T

viii

International Journal of Transpersonal Studies

be viewed as either psychotic or in the grip of a
spiritual emergency.
The next paper, by Kevin O. St. Arnaud,
considers Psychedelic-Assisted Psychotherapy for
Existential Suffering at the End-of-Life. Drawing
on historical and recent studies of the impact
of psychedelic-assisted psychotherapy on the
potentially devastating distress of existential
suffering at the end of life, and from this weaves a
theoretical rationale for the use of such interventions
for terminal patients. Included are considerations
related to the safety and ethical use of psychedelicassisted psychotherapy for end-of-life treatment.
The final general section paper, by Nikos
Yiangou, addresses Transpersonal Dimensions in
Islamic Spirituality—Islam being a spiritual tradition
as yet poorly represented in transpersonal literature.
The author covers a broad sweep of Sufi tradition’s
models of the spiritual journey and offers a view that
these provide a holistic approach to the realization
of complete humanity.
After the Special Topic Section on Transpersonal Participatory Action Research, edited and
introduced by Olga Sohmer, we offer a paper on
Assessing the Effectiveness of Core-Shamanism on
a Group of Westerners: A Brief Research Report, by
Joannic Masson, Yannick Gounden, Charlemagne
Simplice Moukouta, Amal Bernoussi, and Antoine
Saurat. This qualitative report on the experiences
of 27 individuals initiated into therapeutic
shamanism suggests that the experience resulted in
improvements in the practitioners’ lives, increased
belief in spirits, the disappearance of allergies,
among other beneficial results.
The issue continues with a paper by
Stanley Krippner entitled, The Meso-American
Goddess Coatlicue: Too Terrifying for the Spaniards,
which recounts the story of Spanish invaders who
uncovered a buried statue of the goddess Coatlicue
and found it so disturbing that they immediately
re-interred it. The basalt statue was re-excavated
n 1803, and now stands in a museum in Mexico
City, and may carry meaningful symbolism about
the nature of the archetypal feminine.
Glenn Hartelius, Main Editor
California Institute of Integral Studies
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